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WHAT MAKES REPRESENTATIVE CONSTRUCTIVISM 
DEMOCRATIC?  
O QUE TORNA O CONSTRUTIVISMO REPRESENTATIVO 
DEMOCRÁTICO?  
Gustavo H. Dalaqua 
Abstract: 
This article connects J. S. Mill’s democratic theory and practice with the contemporary 
debate surrounding representative constructivism and argues that Mill’s advocacy of 
female suffrage affords an empirical example of the mobilization power of 
representative constructivism. Studying this concrete example of constructivism 
alongside Mill’s theory of political representation clarifies that constructivism is 
democratic to the extent it seeks to make citizens themselves appropriate and contest the 
claims that their representatives construct on their behalf. 
Keywords: representative constructivism; descriptive representation; John Stuart Mill; 
female suffrage. 
Resumo: 
Este artigo associa a teoria e a prática democráticas de J. S. Mill com o debate 
contemporâneo sobre o construtivismo representativo e sustenta que a defesa de Mill 
do sufrágio feminino oferece um exemplo empírico do poder mobilizador do 
construtivismo representativo. O estudo em conjunto deste exemplo concreto do 
construtivismo com a teoria da representação política de Mill mostra que o 
construtivismo é democrático na medida em que procura fazer os próprios cidadãos e 
cidadãs contestarem e se apropriarem das demandas que os representantes constroem 
em seu nome. 
Palavras-chave: construtivismo representativo; representação descritiva; John Stuart 
Mill; sufrágio feminino. 
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1. Introduction 
 According to some interpreters of Considerations on Representative 
Government, the intention of John Stuart Mill in that book is to endorse what Hanna 
Fenichel Pitkin (1967, ch. 4) has called descriptive representation, the theory according 
to which the role of the representative is first and foremost to mirror constituents’ 
identities and demands. In “O paradoxo da representação política,” for instance, 
Antonio Carlos Alkmim (2013, p. 69) maintains that Mill was one of the “main 
advocates” of “descriptive representation.”1 He avers that for Mill, representatives in the 
assembly should “mirror . . . social and demographic attributes” of the population and 
describe its different “segments of opinion” in such a way as to afford a faithful 
“portrait” of the nation (ALKMIM, 2013, p. 69). In a similar vein, William Selinger 
(2015, p. 20) recently asserted that, like most liberal thinkers in modern Britain, Mill 
espoused a mirroring conception of representation:  
In Britain, well into the nineteenth century, liberals continued to draw on the medieval 
theory that parliament was representative only insofar as it served as a mirror of the people 
. . . Parliament was only representative when its composition was an “express image” of the 
nation in its manifoldness. . . . All of the British figures [of modern political theory] – from 
Burke through Mill – subscribed . . . to this view of parliamentary representation. 
Alkmim and Selinger are certainly not isolated instances of this interpretation; 
Mill’s defense of proportional representation in Representative Government can indeed 
 
1Unless otherwise noticed, all translations are mine. I use the expressions “descriptive representation” and 
“descriptivism” interchangeably. My account of descriptive representation descends mainly from 
Pitkin (1967) and does not encompass contemporary defenses of descriptivism. For some 
contemporary proponents of descriptivism – such as Jane Mansbridge (1999) and Iris Marion Young 
(2000) – a descriptive representative is first and foremost someone whose personal history and 
background ensure that her life experiences are similar to her constituents’. Thus conceived, 
descriptivism becomes less opposed to constructivism, for then one need not argue that descriptive 
representatives should only mirror citizens’ pre-given interests and identities. One could, instead, 
defend descriptivism by arguing that descriptive representatives are more likely to construct original 
demands that resonate successfully among their constituents. Nevertheless, even when thus conceived, 
the emphasis on the identity between the representative and the represented makes descriptivism differ 
from constructivism. Though I recognize that the difference between constructivism and descriptivism 
tends to be less pronounced in the works of contemporary descriptivists, I still maintain that 
descriptivism and constructivism represent contrasting conceptions of representation and that each of 
them is not fully encompassed by the other. 
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give the impression that his conception of representation was entirely descriptive.2 
Closer inspection, however, proves this impression to be false. To be sure, my 
contention is that a careful reading of Mill’s oeuvre reveals him to be a proponent of 
what contemporary democratic theorists call representative constructivism. Far from 
simply mirroring pre-given identities and demands, representation for Mill is endowed 
with constructivist power. Accordingly, the role of the representative is not only to 
describe the opinions and ideas that constitute citizens’ identities, but also to construct 
them. 
In what follows, I first explain what descriptive representation consists of. Based 
on the works of Frank Ankersmit, Hanna Pitkin and Stuart Hall, I claim in section two 
that three basic assumptions form the crux of descriptivism: (i) representation is bereft 
of creative power; (ii) representative democracy is a second-best system for direct 
democracy; (iii) the object to be represented is fully formed before representation takes 
place. Then, in section three, I show how each of these assumptions is challenged by 
constructivism, the main features of which are clarified with the help of contemporary 
political theorists such as Lisa Disch, Samuel Hayat, and Ernesto Laclau. 
Next, in section four, Mill’s democratic theory is scrutinized in order to 
substantiate the thesis that he subscribed to representative constructivism. It is argued 
that Mill’s endorsement of constructivism is connected with his conception of 
representation as advocacy and his encomium on compromise. Section five shows that 
Mill espoused constructivism not only in theory but also in practice. Indeed, Mill’s 
advocacy of female suffrage in the House of Commons in 1866 affords an empirical 
example of the mobilization power of representative constructivism. Studying this 
concrete example of constructivism, I contend, can help us identify the two main 
characteristics that differentiate democratic constructivism from fascism. Section six 
explains that Mill’s democratic constructivism is connected with his agora model of 
political representation. The article concludes that Mill’s theory and practice regarding 
political representation give us resources to understand what makes representative 
constructivism democratic. Constructivism is democratic to the extent it seeks to make 
 
2For other interpretations that claim that Mill was a proponent of descriptive representation, see Paulo 
Corval (2015, p. 250), Pietro Costa (2012, pp. 233-34) and Sujith Kumar (2013, p. 128). 
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citizens themselves appropriate and contest the claims that their representatives 
construct on their behalf. 
 
2. Descriptive representation 
 Chapter four of Pitkin’s The Concept of Representation is the locus classicus for 
understanding what descriptive representation is. Put simply, descriptivism is the theory 
in which the role of representation is simply to describe a pre-given social and political 
reality that is formed before representation takes place. “What such an approach often 
produces, is the view that a representative body is distinguished by an accurate 
correspondence or resemblance to what it represents, by reflecting without distortion” 
(PITKIN, 1967, p.60). As one of its early proponents put it, descriptivism posits that 
“the legislature ought to be the most exact transcript of the whole society,” “the faithful 
echo of the voices of the people” (WILSON quoted in PITKIN, 1967, p. 61). 
Descriptivism can thus be interpreted as “the mimetic theory of representation,” 
according to which “the representation of the people should reflect the people 
represented” in an accurate manner (ANKERSMIT, 1996, p. 28). Mimesis, mirror, 
echo, reflection – these words all convey descriptivism’s main characteristic: the idea 
that representatives should only copy (not construct) the object they aim to represent. 
Hence, argues Pitkin (1967, p. 90), descriptivism deprives representation of any creative 
power: 
Finally, the view of representation we have been discussing [i.e., descriptivism] does not 
allow for an activity of representing . . . It has no room for any kind of representing as 
acting for, or on behalf of, others; which means that in the political realm it has no room for 
the creative activities of a representative legislature, the forging of consensus, the 
formulating of policy, the activity we roughly designate by “governing” . . . there is no 
room within such a concept of political representation for leadership, initiative, or creative 
action. The representative is not to give new opinions to his constituents, but to reflect 
those they already have. 
 According to Pitkin, descriptivism’s longing for a “pure” representation that 
only copies and mirrors constituents’ identities puts into question its very representative 
character. It “sounds odd to say that the mirror ‘represents’ my face . . . Somehow 
‘presents’ or ‘shows’ seems more natural here, as if the image is so much like the 
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original, so faithful and accurate, that it is not a re-presentation at all” (PITKIN, 1967, 
p.72). In politics especially, representation is inextricably bound up with the idea of 
animated work, a sort of making that requires from representatives the power to act. 
According to Pitkin (1967, ch. 10), it makes no sense to talk about political 
representation when the power to act is the prerogative of only one side of the 
representative relationship. Political representation, she insists, emerges out of the joint 
action of representatives and the represented. When the latter do all the acting and 
decide everything, representation is no longer in place and what we have then is direct 
democracy. 
 Pitkin’s (1967, pp. 82, 84) extensive analysis of the concept of descriptive 
representation discloses that descriptivism conceives of representation as a second-best 
system for a direct, non-mediated form of politics:  
Certainly some writers [who endorse descriptivism] seem to assume that the essential 
function of a representative body is to vote yes or no on proposals put before it, and that the 
measure of its representativeness is essentially whether it votes as the whole nation would if 
the question were put to a plebiscite. The representative must simply vote as their 
constituents would; and the same result could be achieved by local plebiscites . . . This kind 
of justification . . . is linked with radical democratic ideology, according to which direct 
democracy is the ideal system of government and representation a mere second-best 
approximation.  
 The justification for descriptive representation is premised on the fact that mass 
societies cannot institute direct democracy and hold plebiscites on a constant basis. 
Descriptivists’ abhorrence of any “impurity” that the intermediation process involved in 
representation could produce or add to constituents’ original views is connected with 
their aversion to representation. Representation becomes “impure” for descriptivists 
when, instead of reproducing citizens’ pre-given views, it “distorts” them by adding 
things that did not exist before. 
 Besides demeaning representative democracy as a poor substitute for direct 
democracy, another presupposition inherent in the logic of descriptive representation is 
that constituents have fully formed positions on every subject the representative will 
discuss in the national assembly. Descriptivists “sound as though everyone has opinions 
ready on every possible question, and hence the only political problem is to get accurate 
information about a national opinion which already exists” (PITKIN, 1967, p. 82). As 
Stuart Hall (1997, p. 24) explains, descriptivism assumes that the goal of representation 
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is simply to imitate a pre-existing object “that is already there and fixed in the world.” 
In sum, descriptivism is composed of three basic assumptions: (i) representation is 
bereft of creative power; (ii) representation is a second-best system for a non-mediated, 
direct form of politics; (iii) the object to be represented is fully formed before 
representation takes place. 
3. Representative constructivism 
 Constructivism can be opposed to descriptive representation because it 
challenges the three main assumptions that undergird descriptivism. In contemporary 
democratic theory, constructivism became popular mainly through the work of Laclau 
(DISCH, 2015, p. 490). In Emancipation(s), Laclau (1996, p. 87) claims that “no pure 
relation of representation is obtainable because it is of the essence of the process of 
representation that the representative has to contribute to the identity of what is 
represented.” To clarify his claim, Laclau gives the example of a representative who 
seeks to defend in the national assembly the interests her constituents have in 
maintaining the price of agricultural products. Even in this case, the role of the 
representative is not simply to reflect a fully formed interest, because 
the terrain on which this interest must be represented is that of national politics, where 
many other things are taking place, and even something apparently as simple as the 
protection of agricultural prices requires processes of negotiation and articulation with a 
whole series of forces and problems that far exceeds what is thinkable and deducible from 
place A [i.e., the place where constituents initially formulated their interest]. So, the 
representative inscribes an interest in a complex reality different from that in which the 
interest was originally formulated and, in doing so, he or she constructs and transforms that 
interest. But the representative is thus also transforming the identity of the represented 
(LACLAU, 1996, p. 98). 
 For Laclau, this constitutive dimension is inescapable in representative politics. 
Representation is a constructivist relationship that transforms the identities and demands 
of the subjects involved in it. From such perspective, it would be incorrect to envisage 
representation as a relationship that takes place “between two constituted social 
identities” (HAYAT, 2013, p. 132). In the constructivist approach, representation is cast 
as an interactive process that generates “subjectivation effects” (DISCH, 2014, p. 25; 
HAYAT, 2013, p. 131). As a contemporary defender of constructivism remarks, “acts 
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of representation do not simply reflect constituencies and their interests but help to 
bring them into being” (DISCH, 2012, p. 600). 
 By underlining the creative power of representation, constructivism also casts 
doubt on the third assumption of descriptivism, namely, the idea that the object to be 
represented is fully formed before representation takes place. The object of 
representation – the interests and demands that constitute the identity of a political 
group – is fully formed only through the representative process. This may seem 
counterintuitive at first glance, but think about a situation in which constituents have no 
ready opinion about a topic the representative must analyze in the assembly. In such 
case, the role of a representative is precisely to construct a position her constituents do 
not have.3 
 The last assumption of descriptivism that constructivism denies is the idea that 
representative democracy is the second best of direct democracy. Constructivism is part 
of the so-called “representative turn” in contemporary democratic theory, an intellectual 
movement which gained force in the 1990s that “set about reclaiming representation in 
the name of democracy” (VIEIRA, 2017, p. 5). According to constructivism, the proper 
response to the democratic deficit of coeval representative governments is the demand 
for more representation, not less (LACLAU, 1996, p. 99).As one constructivist has 
explained,  
Representation is not a device for solving the practical problem of getting all citizens 
together somewhere, not a faute de mieux for direct democracy, but the indispensable and 
the only constitutional procedure for generating the political power needed to solve our 
most difficult political and social problems. Even if a direct democracy were realizable . . . 
representation would still be preferable by far. Without representation, our society 
degenerates into a chaos in which we are both helpless and powerless (ANKERSMIT, 
1996, p. 51). 
 Representation is indispensable for coping with the problems democracies face 
nowadays insofar as it allows collective power to emerge. Representation is crucial to 
the generation of democratic power because it requires individuals to group their 
demands into a more or less coherent whole, which then will be defended by their 
elected representative in the assembly. In the absence of representation, popular 
 
3Such construction should not be confused with an arbitrary imposition of demands by the representative 
over the represented. This will be further explored in section five where I differentiate democratic 
constructivism from the fascist theory of representation. 
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participation risks flowing into an ocean of idiosyncratic demands that are unable to 
coalesce into a collective program of action, the upshot of which is political 
powerlessness. 
4. Representative constructivism in Mill 
 Before spelling out Mill’s representative constructivism, it would be good to 
explain why he should not be read as a proponent of descriptive representation. Mill’s 
rejection of descriptivism becomes explicit in chapter twelve of Representative 
Government, where the delegate conception of representation is rejected, and the use of 
imperative mandates discouraged. Popular in the Middle Ages, the imperative mandate 
forbade representatives from doing anything beyond what had been expressly ordered 
by constituents (GOYARD-FABRE, 2003, p. 128 and TOMBA, 2018, pp. 108-10). 
Imperative mandates thus presumed representation should be purely descriptive and 
reduced representatives to the function of “mere delegates” who could only describe the 
static interests constituents had previously instructed them to defend (CW XIX, p. 504).4 
 To the extent they further descriptivism, Mill thinks imperative mandates should 
not be adopted in a representative democracy.5 He argues that “electors” would act 
“unwisely” if they expected “absolute conformity to their opinions” from their 
representative (CW XIX, p. 506). When citizens who belong to the same political group 
ask a representative to present in the assembly a common demand they have, they 
cannot foresee the opposition, or even sheer indifference, that their demand might 
arouse from the part of other representatives. Unlike them, the representative has to 
negotiate with people who come from very different social and political backgrounds. 
The debate she has to carry out in the assembly is much more agonistic than the one 
where the demand to be represented was originally drafted. As Mill remarks, the 
national representative assembly is 
at once the nation’s Committee of Grievances, and its Congress of Opinions; an arena in 
which not only the general opinion of the nation, but that of every section of it, . . . can 
 
4 Following common practice among Mill scholars, references to The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill 
are written as follows: CW VII, p. 313, for Collected Works, volume VII, page 313. 
5For representative governments that are not properly democratic, however, Mill thought the use of 
imperative mandates was acceptable (see CW XIX, p. 508). 
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produce itself in full light and challenge discussion; where every person in the country may 
count upon finding somebody who speaks his mind . . . not to friends and partisans 
exclusively, but in the face of opponents, to be tested by adverse controversy (CW XIX, p. 
432, emphasis added). 
 Mill’s endorsement of constructivism is quite pronounced in this passage. The 
role of representation is not simply to reflect constituents’ pre-given opinions and 
demands, but rather to produce them in full light. Such transformation of constituents’ 
opinions and demands is due to the conflict-ridden deliberative setting of the 
representative assembly. Mill believed that discursive conflict was a constructive force 
in politics (ROSENBLUM, 2008, pp. 144-45). The collision of rival political 
perspectives enlarges citizens’ comprehension of the problems that beset the polity and 
in that sense, Mill argues, improves the perspective of each participant. 
 At first glance, one might think that relating Mill to representative 
constructivism, a theory that has become prominent in democratic theory only recently, 
would be subject to the charge of anachronism. Yet, its recent acclaim notwithstanding, 
constructivism, as Pierre Rosanvallon shows in Le Peuple Introuvable, was already 
present in nineteenth-century theories of political representation. The title of his book 
alludes to the fact that, for several French thinkers in the nineteenth century, “the 
people” did not pre-exist their invocation made by the representative process 
(ROSANVALLON, 1998, p. 24). The task of representation for them was precisely to 
“construct” the people like a sculptor constructs “a work of art” (ROSANVALLON, 
1998, p. 208). Rosanvallon (1998, p. 231) thus concludes that a significant part of 
nineteenth-century theories of representation was “constructivist” not “descriptive.” 
 One could retort that, even if representative constructivism was present in 
France, in England only the mirroring conception of representation existed. That is, for 
instance, the interpretative strategy taken up by Selinger. Seeking to offer a very general 
and comprehensive analysis of political representation in modern political theory, he 
differentiates the French theory of parliamentary representation from its British 
counterpart, arguing that the main difference between them was that the latter, unlike 
the former, was solely descriptive (SELINGER, 2015, p. 20). 
 The aforementioned passage extracted from Mill’s Representative Government 
suffices to put Selinger’s interpretation into question (see CW XIX, p. 432). As John 
Wyon Burrow’s (1988, p. 71) study of Victorian political thought indicates, there were 
P ERI  –  R ev i s t a  de  F i l os o f i a    v . 10  n . 02 ,  20 18   p . 1 0 0 - 1 2 2    I S S N  2 1 7 5  - 1 8 1 1  1 0 9  
two rival conceptions of representation in nineteenth-century British political thought.6 
Whereas theorists such as George Charles Brodrick (1879, p. 137) submitted that the 
role of the representative was only to mirror and echo citizens’ pre-given opinions, other 
British writers believed the representative should oftentimes be a “guide rather than a 
receiver, with a responsibility to his vision of what Mill called ‘a certain order of 
possible progress’” (BURROW, 1988, p. 71). 
 Why have some scholars misread Mill as a supporter of descriptive 
representation? The answer to this question lies in chapter seven of Representative 
Government. There, Mill advocates for proportional representation and affirms that 
“minorities should be adequately represented. No real democracy, nothing but a false 
show of democracy, is possible without it” (CW XIX, p. 452). Given Mill’s 
endorsement of proportional representation, it is understandable that some readers have 
associated him with descriptive representation, for proportional representation has been 
historically used as a justification for descriptivism (PITKIN, 1967, p. 62). For many 
proportionalists, the representative should be a replica of her constituents whose main 
function would be to reflect without distortion their opinions. That, however, is not 
Mill’s view. As Nadia Urbinati has argued, what is unique about Mill’s defense of 
proportionality is that it is based upon a concept of representation as advocacy, not 
descriptivism. 
 “Advocacy has two components: the representative’s ‘passionate’ link to the 
electors’ cause, and the representative’s relative autonomy of judgment” (URBINATI, 
2002, p. 81). On the one hand, the passionate link to the electors’ cause gives 
representatives strong opinions and thus injects conflict in political deliberation. The 
fact that representatives are partisans and not impartial observers is good because 
objections have force when they come “from persons who actually believe them, who 
defend them in earnest, and do their utmost for them” (CW XVIII, p. 245).7 On the 
other hand, their relative autonomy of judgment avoids deliberation degenerating into 
blind dogmatism and gives room for political compromise, a practice Mill deemed 
necessary for the provisional resolution of public problems to be achieved (CW XIX, p. 
 
6On the presence of both descriptive and non-descriptive theories of political representation in Victorian 
political though, see also Gregory Conti (2018).  
7 On Mill’s appreciation of parties and partisanship, see Gustavo Hessmann Dalaqua (2018c), Bruce 
Kinzer (2007, ch. 6) and Russell Muirhead (2014, pp. 99-105). 
P ERI  –  R ev i s t a  de  F i l os o f i a    v . 10  n . 02 ,  20 18   p . 1 0 0 - 1 2 2    I S S N  2 1 7 5  - 1 8 1 1  1 1 0  
344). In representation as advocacy, “the conflict of interests is admitted, but also 
controlled by the distance that representatives are able to keep in relation to the 
positions they advocate” (MIGUEL, 2014, pp. 247-48). This distance is what allows 
representative constructivism to emerge. 
“[C]ertainly, all interests or classes ought to be represented, that is, ought to 
have . . . advocates” (CW XIX, p. 465). For Mill, when we select a representative, we 
do not look for a copy of ourselves who will simply repeat verbatim our demands in the 
assembly (URBINATI, 2002, p. 87).8 Were that the case, selecting a representative 
would not make any sense, for our wish would then be direct participation in the 
legislative process, not representation. When a political group chooses a representative, 
Mill contends, what they look for is a skillful advocate, someone who will best defend 
their interests in a deliberative setting where negotiation and compromise are 
unavoidable. Indeed, representative democracy for Mill is inconceivable without “the 
spirit of compromise,” an expression he uses to denote a non-dogmatic approach to 
politics (CW XIX, p. 344).9 
The willingness to compromise, which Mill associates with representative 
constructivism, recognizes one basic feature of Millian democracy: anti 
foundationalism, the theory according to which transcendental foundations and absolute 
certainty are not available in politics. Presenting an idea that would be later explored by 
Hans Kelsen (1929), Mill links democracy with the recognition of citizens’ fallibilism.10 
Since we can all be equally wrong, the best way to reach public decisions is by listening 
to what everybody has to say. Democracy for Mill requires giving up the pretension that 
one has access to absolute certainty – that is, it requires that one recognizes oneself as a 
fallible being who, in order to acquire knowledge, needs to analyze opposing arguments 
about the same issue. The mind-set of compromise, which ensues from representative 
constructivism, fulfills this requirement and, to that extent, favors democracy. As Mill 
highlights in his vindication of the French Revolution of 1848, those who are used to 
 
8On the differences between descriptivism and representation as advocacy, see also Urbinati (2006, p. 
46). 
9 For a fuller exploration of Mill’s theory of compromise, see Dalaqua (2018a, pp. 114-16) and Dennis 
Thompson (2007). 
10On the similarities between Mill’s fallibilism and Kelsen’s democratic theory, see Dalaqua 
(forthcoming) and Lars Vinx (2007, pp. 136-37). 
P ERI  –  R ev i s t a  de  F i l os o f i a    v . 10  n . 02 ,  20 18   p . 1 0 0 - 1 2 2    I S S N  2 1 7 5  - 1 8 1 1  1 1 1  
compromise end up recognizing the value of conflict and the necessity of constructing 
public policies that can accommodate the largest number of political perspectives 
possible (CW XX, p. 331). As the next section underscores, democratic constructivism 
is bound up with an agonistic conception of politics.  
5. Mill’s advocacy for female suffrage as an example of the mobilization power of 
political representation 
 After writing extensively about political representation, Mill was elected to 
Parliament for Westminster in 1865. In this section, I briefly overview his performance 
as a political representative in the House of Commons in order to argue that Mill 
subscribed to representative constructivism not only in theory but also in practice. 
Mill’s advocacy for female suffrage affords an empirical example of the mobilization 
power of representation that contemporary democratic theorists ascribe to 
constructivism: 
[Constructivism] makes the mobilization conception of political representation analogous 
to aesthetic and literary models of representation that emphasize that representations are 
performative: representing is an activity that produces ontological effects while seeming 
merely to follow from an existing state of affairs . . . Representing rouses a constituency to 
action by giving it a picture of itself that enables it to recognize itself in terms of a 
“generality” – a common enemy, shared problem, shared virtue – that is neither given nor 
self-evident but must be narrated into being (DISCH, 2017, p. 145). 
 When in 1866 Mill proposed in the House of Commons a bill that sought to 
legalize female suffrage, he mobilized several citizens to action and brought a new 
constituency into being: the National Society for Women’s Suffrage (COLLINI 1984, p. 
xxxiii; GRIFFIN, 2012, pp. 12-3). This is not to obliterate the fact that before 1866 
there were women in England who were fighting against their subordination and who 
organized to demand, for instance, greater access to education and to the job market; 
Mill himself recognizes that in The Subjection of Women (CW XXI, pp. 270-71). 
Rather, it is only to acknowledge – as Françoise Le Jeune (2010, p. 116) does – that 
Mill’s representation in the House of Commons introduced a topic that until then was 
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non-existent in parliamentary politics in England, namely, female suffrage. 11 As Mill 
narrates in his autobiography, a consistent social movement advocating for female 
suffrage in England only emerged with the National Society for Women’s Suffrage, 
which was mobilized and constructed because of Mill’s political performance in the 
representative assembly: 
For women not to make their claim to the suffrage at the time when the elective franchise 
was being largely extended, would have been to abjure the claim altogether; and a 
movement on the subject was begun in 1866, when I presented a petition for the suffrage . . 
. But it was as yet uncertain whether the proposal would obtain more than a few stray votes 
in the House: and when . . . the votes recorded in favour of the motion amounted to 73. . . 
the surprise was general and the encouragement great . . . The time appeared to my 
daughter, Miss Helen Taylor, to have come for forming a Society for the extension of the 
suffrage to women (CW I, p. 285). 
 The Society Helen Taylor created was the National Society for Women’s 
Suffrage, a social movement that was instrumental in winning women in England the 
right to vote. No wonder then that Millicent Garret Fawcett, one of the leading activists 
in the British women’s movement, claimed that the very existence of a women’s 
suffragist movement in England was due to Mill (STANTON, 1884, p. 35). 
In a letter sent to a friend in 1866, in which he explained why he advocated for 
female suffrage in a time when most voters in England were not in favor of such cause, 
Mill wrote: “I look upon the House of Commons . . . as an elevated Tribune or Chair 
from which to preach larger ideas than can at present be realized” (CW XVI, p. 1234). 
Mill knew that what mattered was mainly the performative effects of his speeches in 
favor of female suffrage, not the legislative outcome per se. He predicted that politicians 
would be “shocked” with his proposal and anticipated that the bill was not going to be 
approved by the majority of the House of Commons (LEYENAAR and OLDERSMA, 
2007, p. 65). Mill was not frustrated when his prognosis turned out to be right, for his 
main goal was to recruit constituencies that would themselves demand female suffrage. 
In a letter sent to Caroline E. Liddell in 1866, Mill explained he wanted women 
themselves to fight for political emancipation, if only because that would offer a very 
 
11 This is not to say that female suffrage was non-existent outside parliamentary politics. To be sure, 
representative constructivism should not be read as a creation ex nihilo (ALMEIDA, 2018, p. 6). The 
performative power of constructivism to bring a new reality into being is always limited by an already 
existent and sedimented political milieu. Although Mill’s performative representation was doubtless 
responsible for aggrandizing and transforming the concern for female suffrage into a topic of great 
political import, such concern was already shared among some individuals in England. 
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effective response against conservative politicians who argued that women did not care 
about the suffrage (CW XV, p. 168; POPPA, 2017, pp. 67-8). The italics on themselves 
are to highlight the democratic credentials of Mill’s constructivism. To be sure, Mill’s 
political theory indicates that representative constructivism should not be seen as 
necessarily inimical to democracy.12 This is not to deny, of course, the historical 
connections between constructivism and “the fascist theory of representation” (PITKIN, 
1967, p. 107). From the historical association between fascism and representative 
constructivism, however, one should not infer that the latter is doomed to be at odds 
with democratic representation. The articulation between fascism and constructivism is 
contingent and, therefore, can be avoided. As Mill’s advocacy of female suffrage 
testifies, representative constructivism can be democratic. 
A good prolegomenon for understanding how constructivism and democratic 
representation can become compatible is to figure out in what ways fascism made 
representative constructivism incompatible with democracy. Once again, Pitkin’s 
seminal work is of great help. In chapter five of Concept, Pitkin (1967, pp. 107-8) 
explains that the fascist theory of representation amounts to a denial of democracy 
because 
in fascist theory . . . the leader must force his followers to adjust themselves to what he 
does. . . . The leader creates the unity of wills among his followers out of his own inner 
resources, and aligns them to himself. . . . Representation is a power relation, that of the 
leader’s power over his followers; Hitler claimed that he had greater right to say that he 
represented his people than any other statesman. Representation may be a matter of 
consent, but this consent is created by the leader’s energy, intelligence, and masterful 
personality. For the fascist, no other conception is possible, because the people are 
amorphous and incapable of action and will.  
 The fascist strand of constructivism is incompatible with democratic 
representation because it turns the people into passive recipients of the representative’s 
constructions.13 In fascist representation, constituents cannot complement, let alone 
 
12 For interpretations that stress the incompatibility between representative constructivism and 
democracy, see Debora C. Rezende de Almeida (2017, pp. 6-16) and Paulina Ochoa Espejo (2017, pp. 
619-20). 
13 Hannah Arendt (1973, p. 325) observes in The Origins of Totalitarianism that without the totalitarian 
leader, the masses “would lack external representation and remain an amorphous horde . . . Hitler, who 
was fully aware of this . . . expressed it once in a speech addressed to the SA: ‘All that you are, you are 
through me’.” I concur with Arendt’s (1973, p. 325) distinction between fascism and totalitarianism 
and agree that not every fascist leader is totalitarian, but that every totalitarian leader is necessarily 
fascist insofar as he also seeks “uncontested rule over the country.” The kinds of representation that the 
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contest, the claims that the representative constructs and imposes upon them. Fascism 
thus impedes the emergence of the two main attributes of democratic constructivism. 
For one thing, fascist constructivism makes representation linear and unidirectional, as 
though political interests and demands could flow only in one direction: from the 
representative to the represented, from the fascist leader to the people. By thus 
conceiving representation, fascism effaces the interactivity that characterizes democratic 
constructivism (DISCH, 2016, pp. 94-5). Constructivism is democratic when the 
representative relationship it implies is circular and functions as “a two-way process: a 
movement from represented to representative, and a correlative one from representative 
to represented” (LACLAU, 2005, p. 158). Democratic constructivism is necessarily “a 
two-way street” because it entails multiple communicative exchanges between 
representatives and their constituents (SAWARD, 2010, p. 47).  
Rather than transparently transmitting pre-given interests, or simply constituting 
them in a top-down fashion, democratic constructivism comprises a to-and-fro 
movement between the representative and the represented that constantly modifies and 
adapts the political interests in question. Unlike fascist constructivism, there is no clear-
cut distinction between a purely active role and a purely passive role in democratic 
constructivism. The representative claims that emerge out of democratic constructivism 
are constituted by both representatives and constituents. The former are, of course, the 
ones who first construct and advance a representative claim in the public arena. 
Nevertheless, once exposed to the public, a representative claim is engaged critically by 
the audience it seeks to address (GEENENS et al., 2015, p. 520). In a democratic 
government, a representative claim is successful only to the extent it is absorbed and 
reshaped by constituents.  
 Moreover, fascism obliterates the agonistic dimension of representation that is 
part and parcel of democratic constructivism. As Michael Saward (2010, p. 54) puts it, 
what constructivism emphasizes is that “there is no representative claim without its 
being open to a counterclaim or a denial of claim from part of its audience.” The 
meaning of representation is not fixed in democratic constructivism; rather, it is always 
                                                                                                                                          
totalitarian and fascist leaders embody are similar, for both of them evacuate contestation from 
political representation (SACCOMANI, 2010, p. 466). Therefore, Pitkin is right when she identifies 
Hitler as an exponent of fascist representation. 
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caught up in a battle of interpretations (ARDITI, 2015, p. 97).14 Constructivism is 
democratic when constituents have the power to contest and alter the representative 
claim a politician had originally put forth on their behalf. Even though both fascist and 
democratic constructivism presume that political interests and identities are formed 
through representation and are not prior to it, only the latter acknowledges that the 
conflict between representatives and constituents – and among constituents themselves 
– has constructivist power over political interests and identities. 
 Especially in the case of Mill, democratic constructivism builds upon the thesis 
that conflict is a prime source of both political and individual development. Like many 
writers of the nineteenth century, Mill was deeply influenced by the Bildungstradition 
and considered conflict to be of paramount importance for self-development 
(AUDARD, 2009, pp. 86-92; MERQUIOR, 2014, p. 56).15 His democratic agonism 
identifies contestation as a way to give vent to the creative possibilities of the self. 
Mill’s endorsement of representative constructivism is related to his dynamic 
conception of the self as a social construct that is shaped, inter alia, by political 
conflict.16 By allowing contestation between representatives and constituents to take 
place, democratic constructivism is conducive to self-development and liberty. It is 
therefore incorrect to suggest that Mill defended female suffrage only on protective 
grounds. Mill did not think women needed the vote just because they lacked an 
instrument to defend and protect their pre-given interests. To the contrary, he believed 
 
14 Constructivism presumes that “it is proper to the nature of meaning not to exist in things themselves. 
Meaning has to be searched for, a search that constitutes its own foundation” (LEMINSKI, 2011, p. 
13). This constitutes a major difference with descriptivism, which assumes that meaning lies in the 
object itself (HALL, 1997, p. 24). 
15 One of the main theses advanced by the Bildungstradition is that conflict has the power to construct the 
self: “with the beginning of the nineteenth century it became clear that Bildung is connected to the 
development of the individual subject, to the development of a person, who has to ascertain him/herself 
in an area of conflict which is given from the experience of its regulations originating from its nature 
and social contexts” (WINKLER, 2012, pp. 96-7). 
16 It is one thing to argue that the Millian self is a social construct, and yet another to argue that it is 
entirely a social construct. That Mill subscribed to a conception of human nature does not deny the 
social construction of many attributes that constitute the Millian self. Affirming the social construction 
of the self does not rule out the presence of a natural basis upon which this construction takes place. On 
the social construction of the Millian self, see Dalaqua (2018b) and Katherine Smits (2004). 
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women should be enfranchised precisely because that would be an opportunity for them 
to develop themselves and formulate collectively their interests.17 
6. Democratic constructivism and the agora model of political representation 
 Citizens’ power to contest the proposals offered by their representatives is what 
safeguards the democratic character of constructivism. But what makes contestation 
possible in the first place? Mill addresses this concern in Representative Government 
when he advances his “agora model” of political representation (URBINATI, 2002, ch. 
3). In the beginning of the book, he asserts that if representative governments are to be 
democratic, they need to create an equivalent of the ancient “agora” (CW XIX, p. 377). 
The agora was the place in ancient democracies where citizens gathered “to discuss 
public matters” (CW XIX, p. 377). In the agora citizens could meet whenever they 
thought necessary and exchange their opinions about the decisions enacted in the 
“Pnyx,” which was the official meeting place of the Athenian democratic assembly 
(CW XIX, p. 377). Albeit without formal authoritative power, the discussions which 
took place in the agora influenced deeply the decisions reached inside the Pnyx. This 
comes as no surprise, for the citizens who judged about political issues in the agora 
were the same ones who voted on public matters in the Pnyx.  
Mill knew that modern representative governments differed from Athenian 
democracy, because in the former only a tiny percentage of citizens has the power to 
vote on political issues inside representative assemblies (RILEY, 2007, p. 231). The 
vast majority lack the power to do so, and that is why some scholars claim that a real 
democracy, one that effectively empowers the demos, cannot be reconciled with 
representation. Mill thinks otherwise and holds that representative governments can be 
democratic if they create a modern agora, a public space where the demos can contest 
the policies constructed by elected politicians and force them to take into account the 
views of the people. How could that be possible?  
Mill answers that “the press” can offer a “real equivalent” of the ancient agora 
by upholding a space where public opinion can emerge and propagate in such a way as 
 
17 Mill espoused an ethical conception of voting, according to which the exercise of the franchise was a 
source of self-development (CW XVIII, pp. 311-40). 
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to influence elected representatives (CW XIX, p. 377). Mill is careful enough to add 
that the press can be a more or less “adequate” equivalent of the ancient agora (CW 
XIX, p. 377). As Mill warned in his 1859 critique of the tyranny of the majority, the 
means of communication in mass society can preclude public and critical debate once 
they start to propagate the ideas of only one social group (CW XVIII, ch. 2). According 
to Mill, the democratic character of representative governments can only be secured if 
the discourses and opinions circulating in the media are not monopolized. As Bruce 
Baum (2000, p. 82) has explained, Mill’s political theory shows that democratic 
representation requires the democratization of the media, for “concentration of 
ownership and control of the means of communication . . . profoundly conflict with 
democratic ideals.” The contestability of public policies constructed by elected 
politicians is possible only if citizens have access to a genuine public forum, which 
includes and voices the judgments of all groups comprised in the demos. Mill’s agora 
model of political representation shows that protecting people’s power to contest the 
public policies enacted by politicians requires a democratic media, one that is open to 
and inclusive of all political views held by citizens. Democratic constructivism cannot 
do without a media system that allows citizens from all social groups to contest and 
influence their elected representatives. 
7. Conclusion 
 This article has argued that Mill’s theory of representation is constructivist and 
that a proper understanding of his political theory can help clarify what makes 
representative constructivism democratic. Contrary to what some scholars have claimed, 
Mill should not be read as a proponent of descriptive representation. The fact that he 
proposed a bill to legalize female suffrage in England bestows great force to our thesis. 
Why would Mill represent a cause of which his electors were not aware if he subscribed 
to descriptivism? Had Mill thought the duty of the representative resided solely in 
mirroring constituents’ existing views, he would not have advocated for female suffrage 
(see CW XVI, p. 1234). 
 According to Mill, the role of the representative assembly was not simply to 
reproduce already existing opinions but rather to be a place where the opinion of every 
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section of the political community could “produce itself in full light” (CW XIX, p. 432). 
The speeches a representative makes inside the assembly have the power to construct 
new opinions, which in turn can alter the way citizens see themselves and one another. 
Put differently, representative constructivism testifies to the social constitution of the 
self and promotes the formation of collective identities. It demonstrates that citizens’ 
interests and identities are shaped by collective processes and negates an atomistic view 
of society. Constructivism, in short, invalidates the idea that society is the sum of 
discrete and dissociated individuals. 
As Mill’s advocacy of female suffrage demonstrates, representative claims can 
call forth the creation of new collectivities and political movements. His political 
performance as a representative, moreover, can also answer a quandary that, since 
Pitkin (1967, p. 107), has led several scholars to dismiss constructivism as a non-
democratic form of representation. If constructivism argues that constituents are formed 
by acts of representation, then how is one to guarantee that it does not transform 
constituents into passive recipients of whatever views the representative feels like 
attributing to them? This article has suggested that a response to the question can be 
found in Mill’s political theory and practice: what makes representative constructivism 
democratic is the maintenance of a circular and multidirectional relationship between 
representatives and constituents, one in which the latter can interact with and contest the 
former whenever they deem necessary. Constructivism is democratic to the extent it 
seeks to make citizens themselves appropriate and contest the claims that their 
representatives construct on their behalf. 
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